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INTRODUCTION
Muddy Boys, Inc. (Muddy Boys) asks this Court to interpret a statute
as authorizing an administrative agency to award attorney fees in an
adjudicative proceeding. The statutory provision in question states "[i]n an
action brought to enforce the provisions of this section, the court shall a ward
reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party." Utah Code § 5855-503(5)(d) (2014) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the specific
language, Muddy Boys claims that this provision allows the Division of
VJ

Professional Licensing (Division) and the Department of Commerce
(Department), not just a court, to award attorney fees in administrative
adjudicative proceedings under this statute.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
Does Utah Code§ 58-55-503(5)(d) (2014) authorize the Division or the
Department to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing
party in an administrative adjudicative proceeding?

Preservation and Standard of Review
Respondent agrees with Muddy Boys that this issue was preserved
~

below. This issue raises a mixed question of law and fact, which is more law
than fact like and therefore reviewed for correctness. Murray v. Utah Labor

Comm'n, 2013 UT 38,

11 33-34, 308 P.3d 461.
1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Division filed a notice of agency action against Muddy Boys for
hiring unlicensed contractors. R. 1592-1606. The matter was converted to
a formal adjudicative proceeding.

R. 1516-18, 1571-73.

During the evidentiary hearing, the Division made an unopposed
motion to dismiss the matter with prejudice that was granted. R. 1307-09.
Muddy Boys thereafter filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. R. 8341297. This motion was denied, first by the Division (R. 704-27), and then by
the Department. R. 3-16.
Muddy Boys's motion for attorney fees was based on Utah Code§ 5855-503(5)(d) (2014) ("In an action brought to enforce the provisions of this
section, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the
prevailing party."). The Department held that the Division was not a "court"
and therefore did not have subject matter jurisdiction to award attorney fees
and costs based upon this statute. R. 3, 5-14.
Muddy Boys filed a timely petition for judicial review.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah courts read the plain language of a statute as a whole,
interpreting each provision in harmony with the other provisions in the same

2
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statute. This is done because the statute was passed as a whole and not in
parts and sections. Statutory language is not read in isolation. It must be
construed in light of the general purpose of the statute as a whole.
Subsection 503(5)(d) states that a court can award attorney fees and
costs in an action brought to enforce the statute. It does not state that an
administrative agency can do so. Neither the Department nor the Division
JJ

are "courts." As such, subsection 503(5)(d) does not grant these
administrative agencies the power to award attorney fees and costs.
vi

Subsection 5, taken as a whole, describes judicial proceedings to enforce
administrative penalties. Subsection 5(d) should not be read independently
from the rest of subsection 5. Reading it in context with the remainder of
that subsection clearly shows it was intended to permit the district court to
award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in an
judicial enforcement action brought under subsection 5. To read it as
applying to all of section 503 would mean that a prevailing party in a judicial
criminal proceeding under subsections 503(1) or (2) could seek reasonable
attorney fees and costs.
Finally, the Department correctly held that the Division was without
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Muddy Boys's motion for attorney fees

3
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and costs. Where the Department and the Division were without subject
matter jurisdiction, the Department correctly determined it could not
consider other issues raised by Muddy Boys. If the Department erred, then
this Court should not reach these other issues, but remand this proceeding to
the Department for it to consider all the remaining issues.

ARGUMENT
Utah Code § 58-55-503(5)(d) (2014) Does Not Authorize The
Department To Award Attorney Fees.
The Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act includes statutory
penalties for conduct that is made unlawful by the act. Utah Code§ 58-55503 (2014). 1 Subsection 1 makes certain violations of the act class A
misdemeanors. Subsection 2 makes a violation of Utah Code§ 58-55-501(13)
an infraction unless there was an intent to "deprive the person to whom
money is to be paid of the money received" in which case it is treated as theft

1

The Department agrees with Muddy Boys that the 2014 version of
Section 58-55-503 applies to this dispute. 2014 Laws of Utah 716. The
relevant statutory language was not changed by the 2017 amendments to
this statute. 2017 Laws of Utah 1675. This amendment added two new
subsections (a new five and six), renumbering the relevant subsection to
seven. With the 2018 amendments (effective May 8, 2018) the Utah
Legislature did amend the relevant language of the statute, but only after the
final agency action had been issued and this petition for review was filed.
2018 Laws of Utah H.B. 37.
4
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with the penalty depending on the amount in question.
l@

Subsection 3

authorizes the Division to immediately suspend a licensee's license in certain
circumstances. Subsection 4 authorizes the Division to bring adjudicative
proceedings pursuant to Utah's Administrative Procedures Act in the case of
other identified violations, including assessing fines. And subsection 5
authorizes the collection of administrative penalties in the district court:
(5)(a) A penalty imposed by the director under Subsection (4)(h)
shall be deposited into the Commerce Se·rvice Account created by
Section 13-1-2.
(b) A penalty that is not paid may be collected by the director by
either referring the matter to a collection agency or bringing an
action in the district court of the county in which the person
against whom the penalty is imposed resides or in the county
where the office of the director is located.
(c) A county attorney or the attorney general of the state is to
provide legal assistance and advice to the director in any action
to collect the penalty.
(d) In an action brought to enforce the provisions of this section,
the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the
prevailing party.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-503(5) (2014).

A.

Neither The Division Nor The Department Is A Court.

One reason that Muddy Boys's attempts to apply subsection (5)(d) to
subsection 4 (adj~dicative proceedings before the Division and Department)
fails is that subsection (5)(d) limits the power to grant reasonable attorney

l..:dJ

5
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fees and costs to a "court" in an action brought to enforce this section.
Neither the Division nor the Department is a "court."
Muddy Boys's reliance on Peterson v. Provo City, 2002 UT App 430, *1
is misplaced.

In that opinion, this Court did mention a "Provo

administrative court's finding," without any explanation of what such a body
might be. But Muddy Boys has failed to cite to any Utah statutes that
describe either the Division or the Department as "courts." Nor has Muddy
Boys provided other Utah authority describing Utah administrative agencies
.

.

as "courts." In its final agency action, the Department explained that "[t]he
term 'court,' though not often used in statutes to.refer to administrative
agencies, is used broadly in agency adjudicative proceedings as a matter of
respect when referring to the presiding officer." R. 9.
However, section 58-55-503 does not describe the proceedings before
the Division or the Department as court actions. Nor does it label these
administrative bodies as courts. Proceedings under subsection 503(4) are
\\i.;,

described as "adjudicative proceeding[s] conducted under Title 63G, Chapter
4, Administrative Procedures Act."

Utah Code § 58-55-503(4)(a). Indeed,

the definition of an "agency" under Utah's Administrative Procedures Act

6
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specifically includes departments and divisions, but expressly excludes "the
~

courts." Utah Code§ 63G-4-103(1)(b).
Further proof that the Division and the Department are not "courts" is
found in the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor

Commission, 2009 UT 71, 222 P.3d 55. There the Court held that Utah's
Civil Procedure Rule 60 did not apply to administrative proceedings. The
Court explained that the "scope of our rules is limited by the scope of the
authority granted to this court by the Utah Constitution. Thus, we can
~

apply these rules only to 'the courts of the state.' We are powerless to
impose our court rules on proceedings outside of state and local courts." Id.

~

,r 17.

It is significant that Utah's Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly

define "trial court" to mean "the court or administrative agency, commission,
or board from which the appeal is taken or whose ruling is under review."
Jl

Utah R. App. P. l(b). If "court" commonly included administrative bodies
there would have been no need to include this time saving definition to avoid
~

repeating in each rule the list of administrative bodies, other than courts,
from which appeals might come.
This Court reached the same result in a series of decisions culminating
in Morgan v. Department of Commerce, 2017 UT App 225, 414 P.3d 501, cert.

7
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denied, 414 P.3d 501 (Utah 2018). This Court held that statutes of
limitations that apply to civil court proceedings did not apply to
administrative proceedings. Id.

,r,r 5-10.

In Morgan, and two prior appeals,

this Court "determined that an administrative proceeding is not a civil action
and that in the absence of specific legislative authority, the civil statutes of
limitations in Title 78 are inapplicable to administrative proceedings." Id.

,r

8.

B.

Section 503 Must Be Read As A Whole And Its Separate
Provisions Interpreted In Harmony With Each Other.

Muddy Boys asks this Court to interpret subsection 5(d) in isolation
and without reference to the rest of the subsection. It argues that, because
this subsection uses the word "section," it must be applied to the entire
section without any consideration of the intent or meaning of the remainder
of subsection 5. That subsection 5(d) authorizes attorney fees and costs in
any proceeding related to section 503. But Utah's canons of statutory
construction mandate that courts construe a statute's language in isolation,
but as a whole, with all of its provisions construed so that they are
harmonious with each other. Esquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2005 UT 78,
125 P.3d 901. The problem in reading a particular statutory phrase in
isolation is that it may seem susceptible to two or more reasonable
8
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,r 9,

interpretations. Id.
r4'

,r 10.

Only when read as a whole can the meaning of

the pht~ase be clear. This is done because a statute "is passed as a whole and
not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent."

State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81,
2009 UT 10,

,r 12, 171 P.3d 426; see also H. U.F.

v. W.P. W.,

,r 32, 203 P.3d 943 ("We read the plain language of a statute as a

whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other provisions in the
same statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters").
And a "court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain
vJ

meaning works an absurd result or is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or
in blatant contravention of the express purpose of a statute." Savage v. Utah

Youth Village, 2004 UT 102,

,r 18, 104 P.3d 1242 (internal quotation marks

omitted).
Likewise, this Court has held that subsections of a statute must be
read together to determine the plain meaning of the statute as a whole. In

Monarrez v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2014 UT App 219, 335 P.3d
913, affirmed 2016 UT 10, 368 P.3d 846, the issue was when an action under
the Utah Government Immunity Act needed to be filed. Before the action
.:0

could be filed, a notice of claim needed to be filed and either denied or
presumed denied after the expiration of the time for the government to deny

9
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the claim. The plaintiff urged this Court to read Utah Code§ 63G-7-403(2)
in isolation. Id.

,r 10.

The subsection stated that the action needed to be

filed "within one year after denial of the claim or within one year after the
denial period specified." Id.

,r 14.

Doing so would have permitted the

plaintiff to choose which of two events would apply to his action. Instead
this Court read subsection 2 in harmony with subsection 1 that made it clear
that the running of the denial period only applied where the notice of claim
had not been previously denied. Id.
A similar result was reached in Huckins v. Rolfe, 2009 UT App 22, 204
P.3d 186. Huckins asked this Court to read Utah Code § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii) in
isolation. The subsection stated that "The [D]ivision shall immediately
reinstate a person's license upon receiving written verification of the person's
dismissal of a charge for a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517."

Huckins,

,r 8.

Rejecting Huckin's argument, this Court held that the

subdivision's broader language must be read in harmony with the more
limited language of its preceding subsection that spoke of reinstatement of
ninety-day suspensions in certain circumstances. Id.

,r,r 9-11.

"Huckins's

argument would require us to read section 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii) in isolation not
only from the statute as a whole but also from the immediately preceding

10
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introductory subsection (7)(b)(i). We do not interpret statutes in this way
~

and accordingly reject Huckins's interpretation of section 53-3-223." Id.

1

11.
~

Here, Utah Code § 58-55-503(5) (2014) is divided into four subsections.
Subsection (5)(d) cannot be read as an independent subsection. Muddy
Boys's isolation-based reading would lead to an absurd result. H. U.F., 2009
UT 10,

1 32 (statute must be interpreted so as to avoid rendering some part

nonsensical or absurd). It argues that subsection (5)(d) permits the
awarding of attorney fees in agency adjudicatory proceedings brought under
subsection 4.
~

But there is nothing in subsection (5)(d) that would limit its

application to just subsection 4. Under Muddy Boys's theory, subsection
(5)(d) would necessarily apply to the entire statute including criminal
prosecutions brought under subsections 1 and 2 of section 503. Allowing the
prosecution, or the criminal defendant, to seek reasonable attorney fees and
costs in all criminal proceedings brought under section 503 would lead to an
absurd, confused, or blatantly inoperable result.
The same would be true of any immediate suspension proceeding under

.t£J

subsection 3.

No such problems are created if subsection (5)(d) is read as one

.d)

11
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of four related parts of subsection 5. Reading subsection 5 as a whole avoids
any questionable or absurd results.
Subsection 503(5) sets out the Division's authority to collect penalties
assessed under subsection 503(4) and what should be done with them once
collected. Subsection 503(5)(a) states that collected penalties should be
deposited in the Commerce Service Account. Subsection 503(5)(b) provides
the director of the Division two methods of collecting penalties: "referring the
matter to a collection agency;" or "bringing an action in the district court."
Subsection 503(5)(c) requires the appropriate county attorney or the Utah
Attorney General to "provide legal assistance and advice to the director in
any action to collect the penalty."
Reading subsection 503(5)(d) in relation to its immediately preceding
subsections allows the court to award "reasonable attorney fees and costs to
the prevailing party" in enforcement proceedings brought under subsection
503(5). The use of the word "court," as opposed to district court used in
subsection (5)(b) does not require a different result. The "court," as is often
done, is a shortened reference to the use of "district court" mentioned earlier
ih Subsection (5)(b).

12
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C.

Muddy Boys's Other Issues Are Not Properly Before This
Court.

This Court only has authority to review the Department's final action.

Utah Physicians for a Healthy Env't v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah Dep't of Envtl.
~

Quality, 2016 UT 49,

1 12, 391 P.3d 148.

It does not have authority to

review the Division's decisions. On review, Muddy Boys asks this Court to
reach two issues that the Department did not reach: whether the Division's
Director had a conflict that prevented the Director from ruling on the
attorney fees issue; and, whether the Division erred in not providing Muddy
l.:J

Boys copies of communications between the Division's Administrative Law
Judge and the Division. Brief of Appellant at 36-40.
The Department held that it could not reach these issues if it was
without subject matter jurisdiction over Muddy Boys's motion for attorney
\$

fees.

R. 5-6. In doing so, the Department followed this Court's decision in

Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 491,

1 10, 128 P.3d 31

(''because subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to this court's power to
consider the substantive issues, the requirement that the court have proper
jurisdiction over the subject of the dispute cannot be waived.").
Having held that the Division, and the Department, were without
subject matter jurisdiction over Muddy Boys's attorney fees claims, the
13
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Department correctly refused to reach any other issue. R. 6-7. If this Court
finds that the Department erred in its decision, the correct remedy would be
to remand this matter to the Department to consider the attorney fees issue
and any other issues that Muddy Boys has properly preserved.
If this Court holds that the Department was correct, that it did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over the attorney fees claim, then the
Department properly refused to consider these other issues. And this Court
should not consider them either.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, administrative proceedings before the
Division or Department should not be considered a "court" and the
Department's final agency action denying the award of attorney's fees should
be upheld.
Respectfully submitted

Isl Brent A. Burnett
BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Solicitor General
Attorney for the Department of
Commerce

14
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---------

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and
ORDER ON REVIEW

Muddy Boys, Inc.,

PETITIONER

DOPL

INTRODUCTION

This matter came before the Department of Commerce upon a request for agency
review filed on behalf of Muddy Boys, Inc. ("Petitioner") seeking review of an adverse
decision by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division,,).

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW

Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 630-4-301, and Utah Administrative Code, RlSJ-4-901 et seq.
ISSUES REVIEWED

Whether Petitioner has failed to establish that the Division has subject matter
jurisdiction:to grant Petitioner's motion for attorney fees and costs.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

On November 6, 2015, the Division issued a Notice of Agency Action

(hereafter, "Agency Action Matter") against Petitioner for hiring an unlicensed
subcontractor.
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2.

A hearing was scheduled on the Agency Action Matter on November 30,

2016. After a recess in the hearing, the Division moved for the dismissal of the Agency
Action Matter. On December l, 2016, dismissal was entered with prejudice.

3.

On December 14, 2016, Petitioner filed its motion for attorney fees and

costs against the Division ("Motion"). The parties submitted their briefs on Petitioner's
Motion. On June 19, 2017, the Division Director issued his order denying the Motion.
4.

On July 19, 2017, Petitioner filed a request for agency review on the

denial of attorney fees and costs along with its Memorandum in Support of Muddy Boys

Inc. 's Written Request for Administrative Review (hereafter, "Petitioner's
Memorandum.")
5.

The Division filed its response memorandum on August 2 l, 2017 and

·Petitioner filed its Reply on August 31, 2017.

6.

On September 11, 2017, the Division filed its Objection to certain matters

raised in Petitioner's Reply Memorandum.

7. · Petitioner filed its Respoi:tse to Objection/Surreply of the Division on
September 15, 2017.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The standards for agency review within the Department of Commerce

correspon9 to those established by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"),
Utah Code Annotated Section 630-4-403(4) and Utah Admin. Code RlSl-4-905.
~

2.

In this matter, Petitioner appeals from the Division Director's Order

denying its Motion for attorney fees and costs. While the Order mentioned certain
procedural issues as to whether Petitioner's Motion was properly filed, the Order did not
2
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address those procedural issues, but dealt only with the Division's authority with respect
to attorney fees and costs. Order on Respondent's Motion for Attorney Fees, p. 2. The
Division Director held that the Division does not have the statutory authority to make an
award of attorney fees and costs in an administrative adjudication.
3.

On agency review, Petitioner argues that the Division Director's

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §58-55-503(5)(d) 1 was incorrect. Petitioner maintains
that the plain meaning of the statute allows the administrative agency to grant a request
for attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in actions including the Agency Action
Matter.
4.

In its response memorandum, the Division argues that it is not authorized

by statute to grant Petitioner's Motion and therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
A.

Standard of Review

5.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed by the Executive

Director under a correctness standard. State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,116, 224

P.3d 720. Subject matter jurisdiction is also a question of law reviewed for correctness.
j;j)

Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 870 P.2d 291, 292 (UT Ct. App.
I 994).

B.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

6.

The Division is a statutorily created administrative agency, and its subject

matter jurisdiction is limited and fixed by statute. Bevans v. Indus. Comm'n, 790 P.2d
573, 576 (Utah App. 1990). "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the
court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot proceed." Varian-Eimac,
1

Jj

All citations to Utah Code Ann. §58-55-503 are to the version adopted by the Legislature in 2014.
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5

Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted). Without
subject matter jurisdiction~ the Division lacks the ~Jower to do anything beyond
dismissing the proceeding. Blaine Hudrnn. at 292. Subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to an agency's power to consider the substantive issues and thus cannot be
waived. Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 491, ~ I0, 128 P.Jd 31.
Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold question, it may be raised at any time,
including during the appeal process. Brown v. Division of Water Rights of Dep 't. of

Natural Res., 2010 UT 14, ~fl 3,228 P.Jd 747). 2
7.

As discussed in Section E below, Petitioner argues that the Division has

the power to grant its Motion for attorney fees and costs. Petitioner makes additional
arguments on agency review, including that the Division erred in converting the Agency
Action Matter to a formal adjudicative proceeding and thus eliminating Petitioner's right
to a de novo trial court review, that Petitioner was the prevailing party in the Agency
Action Matter, that the Division created additional attorney fees for Petitioner by taking
unreasonable stances on various issues, that the Division Director's Order raises new
issues not previously opposed by the Division's counsel, that Petitioner's Motion. for
attorney fees and costs was timely and properly raised, that the Division Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") permitted Petitioner to brief the Motion under Rule 73(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the Division Director's decision to rule on the Motion
instead of the ALJ who was assigned to cond:uct the formal adjudication was unfair and a
violation of Petitioner's right to due process of law. However, as discussed below, the
Executive Director concludes that the Division does not have subject matter jurisdiction

2

Therefore any claims by Petitioner that the Division's counsel did not properly raise subject matter
jurisdiction at any point in the Division's proceedings are irrelevant.
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to grant Petitioner's Motion for an award of attorney fees and costs, and she declines to
address Petitioner's additional issues. Petitioner's request for agency review and its
various arguments are to support its position that it is entitled to an award of attorney tees
and costs, but where it is concluded that the Division cannot award attorney fees and
costs, there is nothing more to be considered beyond a remand to the Division for
dismissal of Lhe matter. 3 Blaint! Hu,t.wn. at 292.

C.

Rules of Statutory Interpretation

8.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §68-3-11, H[w]ords and phrases are to be

construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language.,. Section 683-11 (emphasis added).

9.

The rules of statutory construction were addressed by the Utah Supreme

Court in In re R.B.FS.. 2011 UT 46,258 P.3d 583, as follows:
When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, "our primary goal
is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." To discern
legislative intent, we begin by looking to the plain language of a statute.
As part of our plain language analysis, we read the language of the statute
•'as a whole" and also in "relation to other statutes. " In so doing, we
"read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." We also
"assume that each term included in the [statute] was used advisedly" and
seek to give effect to "every word, clause and sentence ... if such can be
reasonably done. "

In re R.B.FS., ~12 (emphasis added, citations omitted). See also, Lyon v. Burton, 2000
. UT 19, 1 17, 5 P.3d 616 (holding that the plain language of a statute must be read as a

whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute
0g

and other statutes under the same or related chapters.)

·' For this san,e reason, it is not necessary to address the Division's motion to strike the due process
arguments raised in Petitioner's Reply that the Division maintained were not properly preserved.

5
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1

10.

"An equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a

court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an
absurd result or is 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the

express purpose of a statute."' Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102,118, 104
P.3d 1242 (citations omitted); State v. ./e.ffries, 2009 UT 57, 15, 217 P.3d 265. The
terms in a statute "are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal
fashion. " 4 Therefore, in interpreting Subsection 58-55-503(5)(d), the Executive Director
is guided by the principle that a statute is generally construed according to its plain
language unless the plain language does not make sense in light of the context of the
provision and in light of other provisions that when read in-harmony with Subsection
503(5)(d) indicate that the Division is not authorized to grant an award of attorney fees
and costs in its administrative adjudications.

D.

Applicable Law

11.

The Division was created to administer and enforce all professional

licensing laws so as to protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Utah. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 13-1-1 and 58-1-103. The Division Director's authority and
responsibilities are set forth in Section 58-1-106, which include adopting and enforcing

rnles to administer Title 58, conducting investigations, taking administrative and judicial
action against persons in violation of the laws administered by the Division, and issuing
or refusing to issue licenses to applicants.
12.

Section 58-55-103 of the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act creates

the Construction Services Commission and authorizes the Commission, with the
4

Morton Int'/, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 58 I, 591 (Utah 1991 ).
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l:t.

concurrence of the Division Director, to administer and enforce the chapter, including
licensing licensees, establishin~ examination standards, conducting administrative
hearings not delegated to an administrative law judge, and imposing sanctions against
licensees.
13.

Neither Section 58-1-106 nor Section 58-55-103 authotizes the Division

or the Commission to grant attorney fees and costs in adjudicative proceedings. In
conducting adjudicative proceedings, the Division and the Commission must comply
with the procedures set forth in UAPA. Sections 58-1-l 08 and 58-55-103(9). While
Sections 58-1-106 and 58-55-103 grant the Division and the Commission the power to

conduct adjudicative proceedings, to issue c~ase and desist orders and to impose fines or
penalties for violations of the licensing laws, the only remedy available to enforce orders
resulting from Division adjudicative proceedings is set forth in UAPA. Under UAPA's
Subsection 630-4-501 ( 1)(a), the Division must file an enforcement action in the district
court. A specific provision in the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act also notes this
procedure. See Subsection 58-55-503(5)(b) below.
14.

Utah Code Ann. §58-55-503 is titled "Penalty for unlawful conduct-

Citations.'' Subsections 503(1) and (2) identify conduct that constitutes a Class A
misdemeanor or an infraction. Subsection 503(3) identifies the grounds for immediate
suspension of a license by the Division and the Commission. Subsection 503(4)
addresses the Division's citation authority and adjudicative proceedings before the
ti}

agency, including the authority to issue fines. In particular, Subsection 503(4) provides:
(h) Except as provided in Subsection (5), the director or the director's
designee shall assess a fine in accordance with the following:
(i) for a first offense handled pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), a fine of up
to $1,000;

7
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(ii) for a second offense handled pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), a fine of
up to $2,000; and
(iii) for any subsequent offense handled pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), a
fine of up to $2,000 for each day of continued offense.

Subsection 503(5) provides as follows:
(5)(a) A penalty imposed by the director under Subsection (4)(h) shall be
deposited into the Commerce Service Account created by Section l 3-1-2.
(b) A penalty that is not paid may be collected by the director by either
referring the matter to a collection agency or bringing an action in the
district court of the county in which the person against whom the penalty

is imposed resides or in the county where the office of the director is
located.
(c) A county attorney or the attorney general of the state is to provide legal
assistance and advice to the director in any action to collect the penalty.
(d) In an action brought to enforce the provisions of this section, the court
shall award reasonable attorney.fees and costs to the prevailing party.

Subsection 58-55-503(5) (emphasis added).

E.

Subsection 58-55-503(5)(d) Does Not Grant the Division Authority to Award
Attorney Fees and Costs in Administrative Proceedings

15.

Petitioner maintains that the language in Subsection 58-55-503(5)(d), "[i]n

in action brought to enforce the provisions of this section, the court shall award
reasona_ble attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party/' should be interpreted to allow
the Division authority to grant Petitioner's Motion for attorney fees and costs.
Petitioner's arguments can be summarized as follows:
•

the reference to "an action brought to enforce the provisions of this
section" is broad enough to include the Division,s action against
Petitioner for hiring an unlicensed subcontractor, the Agency Action
Matter;

•

The Legislature used the broad tenn "section," thus referring to the
entire Section 58-55-503, which covers judicial court 5 matters as well
as matters before the Division;

s Because the meaning of "court st in Subsection 58-55-503(3)(d) has been raised as an issue in this case,
these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law'and Order on Review use the phrase "judicial court" to refer to

8
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•

the Legislature's choice to use the term "subsection'' in prior
provisions such as Subsection 503(3)(a) (which discusses grounds for
immediate suspension of a license) indicates that the Legislature
advisedly used the te1m "section'' rather than Hsubsection" in drafting
Subsection 503(5)(d), and intended to make the attorney fees and cost
language applicable to earlier subsections. Petitioner cites to case
authorities for the principle that "the expression of one should be
interpreted as the exclusion of another;"

•

had the Legislature intended that the attorney fees and cost provision

VP

be applicable only to the Division's action in district court to enforce
imposed penalties addressed in Subsection 503(5)(b), it would have
used the term "subsection" in Subsection 503(5)(d) as the Legislature
had done in prior subsections;
•

the plain meaning of the term "court" in Subsection 503(5)(d) is broad
and includes the Division, which acts as an administrative court or
tribunal;

•

had the Legislature intended that only the district courts would have
authority to grant attorney fees and costs, it would have used the
phrase "district court," as it did in prior subsections like Subsection
503(5)(b); and

•

in interpreting Subsection 503(5)(d), we cannot insert language that
the Legislature did not choose to use.

\j;)

Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 4-8.

16.

Petitioner has raised legitimate points as to the principles of statutory

construction. It is tme that the tenn ''section" used in ~tatutes generally refers to the
broader provision and not to specific subsections. The term ' 4action'~ may be used in a
statute to refer to an action before the judicial courts or one before an admini~trative
agency. The term "court," though not often used in statutes to refer to administrative
agencies, is used broadly in agency adjudicative proceedings as a matter of respect when
referring to the presiding officer. I-i-owever, the task here is to determine whether the

the courts in the judicial branch, thus distinguishing them from any proceedings before a presiding officer
in an administrative agency.

9
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broad interpretation of these terms proposed by Petitioner is a reasonable interpretation in

light of the conlext of the language used in Subsection 503(5)(d) and when <;onsidered in
conjunction with other related provisions. While we look to the plain meaning of the
terms in Subsection 503(5){ d). we must also consider the context of the terms in the

statute as a whole and we must harmonize them with other related provisions; while we
seek to give effect lo every word, we must also determine if that is possible and
ureasonable." Section 68-3-11; In re R. B. FS., at ~12;J~ffi-ies, at

,js; Savage, at ~18;

Lyon. at 117. Even in Carrier v. Salt Lake County. 2004 UT 98~ I 04 P.3d 1208, a case on

which Petitioner relies. the Supreme Court stated that it is necessary to look to the context
· in which a ~erm is used. as well as the intended purpose and means of accomplishing it by
the proper application of the language used. Carrier. at ~1132-33.
17.

Upon considering the various provisions noted in Section D above, it is

clear to the Executive Director that the Division Di_rector correctly interpreted Subsection
58-55•503(5)(d) as not authorizing the Division to award attorney fees and costs in its

administrative adjudica'tive proceedings, but only giving that power to the judicial courts
in actions filed by the Division to enforce its administrative orders. In interpreting

Subsection 58-55-503(5)(d)t we must remember that Title 58 of the Utah Code regarding
Occupations and Professions was passed by the Utah Legislature as a whole and not in
parts or sections, and we must construe Subsection 503(5)(d) in connection with every

other part or section of Title 58 to produce a harmonious whole.
18.

The various provisions in Section 58-55-503 cover criminal conduct that

would necessarily be adjudicated in the judicial cou11 system,6 adjudicative proceedings
before the Di'vision and the Commission such as immediate license suspensions and
'' Subsections 58-55-503( I) and (2).

10
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citations, 7 and actions in the district cou1t brought by the Division to enforce any imposed
penalties. 8 Regardless of the fact that "sectionn usually refors to an entire section and not
to a specific subsection of a statute, the term "section" in Subsection 503(5)(d) C'[i]n an
action brought to enforce the provisions of this section, the court shall award reasonable

attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party") cannot be interpreted to refer to all
actions before judicial courts and before the Division presiding officers, because such an
interpretation would overlook the context of the language used. In particular, the
substance of Subsection 503(5) is the "penalty imposed by the director" - 503(5)(a) states
where that penalty should be deposited, (S)(b) states how the Division can collect the
penalty by refeITing the matter to a collection agency or bringing an action in the district
court, and (5)(c) states who shall act as attorney for the Division in ''any action to collect
the penalty." It follows that 503(5)(d)'s reference to "an action brought to enforce the
provisions of this section," also means an action to collect the "penalty imposed by the
director."
19.

The fact that the Legislature placed the. subject language under Subsection

503(5) is crucial to our interpretation of the statute. If the Legislature had intended to
make the attorney fees and costs language applicable to the entire Section 503 as
Petitioner ~aintains, the Legislature would have placed the language authorizing the
award of attorney fees and costs in a separate subsection altogether, and would have
numbered that subsection as 503(6). The Legislature's choice to place the language
under Subsection 503(5), which is all about penalties imposed by the Division, indicates
that "section" in Subsection 503(5)(d) refers to Subsection 503(5) and not to all of
7
8

Subsections 58-55-503(3) and (4).
Subsection 58-55-503(5)(b).
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Section 503; "action to enforce the provisions" means an action in the "district court" to
col~ect the penalty as provided in Subsection 503(5)(b) and not a citation, immediate
suspension or other adjudicative proceeding initiated by the Division against a licensee.
This interpretation does not insert any terms into Subsection 503(5)( d)

20.

as Petitioner clai.ms, but rather gives effect to the context of Subsection 503(5) within
Section 503. This interpretation also harmonizes Subsection 503(5)(d) with other
provisions in Title 58, including Section 58-1-106 and 58-55-103, neither of which
empower the Division or the Commission with authority to grant attorney fees and costs
in agency adjudicative proceedings.

F.

Summary

21.

In summary, Petitioner has relied on legitimate principles of statutory

construction in making its "plain meaning" arguments about the meaning of various
terms in Subsection 58-55-503(5)(d). However, Petitioner applies a very broad
interpretation to each of the terms "action," ''section," and "court." Such a broad
interpretation is not reasonable in light of the context of Subsection 58-55-503(5)(d), and
when considered in harmony with other related provisions. The Division Director's
statutory interpretation was correct and is hereby affirmed. The Legislature has not
authorized the Division to grant an award of attorney fees and costs in its adjudicative
proceedings. Thus, the Division did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner's
Motion. While the Division Director denied Petitioner's Motion, under the authority of
Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, dismissal of Petitioner's Motion was

the proper procedure. Blaine Hudson, at 292.

12
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ORDER ON REVIEW

Because the Division lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner's Motion
for attorney fees and costs, this matter is remanded to the Division with instructions that
Petitione(s Motion be dismissed.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition
for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 630-4-401 and 630-4-403,
Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust
administrative remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgepus v.

Department of Commerce, et al., 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the
date of this Order pursuant to Section 630-4:302.
i{

Dated this

fu -

day of November, 2017.

Francine A. Giani, Executiv D rector
Utah Department of Commerce
vj)

vJJ
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the~day of November, 2017, the undersigned served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on
Review by certified and electronic mail to:

DA YID R NIELSON ESQ
M[CHAEL D LICHFIELD ESQ
SKOUBYE NIELSON & JOHANSEN LLC
999 E MURRAY HOLLADAY RD #200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84117
david(@snilc!.!ul.com
m ichac lf,i{snj legal .corn

and caused a copy to be electronically mailed to:

Mark B. Steinagel, Director (msteinagel@utah.gov)
Chris Rogers, Bureau Manager (crogers@utah.gov)
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Sterling Corbett, Assistant Attorney General (sterlingc@agutah.gov)
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South - Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872

nistrative Assistant
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
Box 146741
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6741
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OFTHESTATEOFUTAH
IN THE MATIER OF the license of:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
MUDDY BOYS, INC.

Case No.: DOPL 2015-605

To practice as a contractor in the State of
Utah.

The Executive Director of the Utah Department of Commerce having remanded the
matter to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division") with instructions
that Muddy Boys, Inc's Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs be dismissed,
'
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

Muddy Boys, Inc's Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs is dismissed.

7~

DATED this _ _ _ _ day of December, 2017.

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LICENSfNG

~CTOR
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I c'ertify that I have this day served this ORDER OF DISMISSAL_on the parties of record
in this proceeding by sending a copy by email to:
David R. Nielson
david@osnlaw.com
Michael D. Lichfield
michael@osnlaw.com

Sterling R. Corbett
sterlingc@agu tah. gov

DATED this

___Q__

day of December, 2017
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Utah Code

21

~

Effective 5/13/2014
Superseded 5/9/2017
58-55-503 Penalty for unlawful conduct -- Citations.
(1)
(a)
(i) A person who violates Subsection 58-55-308(2), Subsection 58-55-501 (1 ), (2), (3), (4), (5),
(6), (7), (9), (10), (12), (14), (15), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), or (29), or Subsection
58-55-504(2), or who fails to comply with a citation issued under this section after it is final,
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(ii) As used in this section in reference to Subsection 58-55-504(2), "person" means an
individual and does not include a sole proprietorship, joint venture, corporation, limited
liability company, association, or organization of any type.
(b) A person who violates the provisions of Subsection 58-55-501 (8) may not be awarded and
may not accept a contract for the performance of the work.
(2) A person who violates the provisions of Subsection 58-55-501 (13) is guilty of an infraction
unless the violator did so with the intent to deprive the person to whom money is to be paid
of the money received, in which case the violator is guilty of theft, as classified in Section
76-6-412.
(3) Grounds for immediate suspension of a licensee's license by the division and the commission
include:
(a) the issuance of a citation for violation of Subsection 58-55-308(2), Section 58-55-501, or
Subsection 58-55-504(2); and
(b) the failure by a licensee to make application to, report to, or notify the division with respect
to any matter for which application, notification, or reporting is required under this chapter or
rules adopted under this chapter, including:
(i) applying to the division for a new license to engage in a new specialty classification or to do
business under a new form of organization or business structure;
(ii) filing a current financial statement with the division; and
(iii) notifying the division concerning loss of insurance coverage or change in qualifier.
(4)
(a) If upon inspection or investigation, the division concludes that a person has violated the
provisions of Subsection 58-55-308(2), Subsection 58-55-501(1), (2), (3), (9), (10), (12), (14),
(19), (21 ), (22), (23), (24 ), (25), (26), (27), (28), or (29), Subsection 58-55-504(2), or any rule
or order issued with respect to these subsections, and that disciplinary action is appropriate,
the director or the director's designee from within the division shall promptly issue a citation to
the person according to this chapter and any pertinent rules, attempt to negotiate a stipulated
settlement, or notify the person to appear before an adjudicative proceeding conducted under
Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act.
(i) A person who is in violation of the provisions of Subsection 58-55-308(2), Subsection
58-55-501(1), (2), (3), (9), (10), (12), (14), (19), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28),
or (29), or Subsection 58-55-504(2), as ·evidenced by an uncontested citation, a stipulated
settlement, or by a finding of violation in an adjudicative proceeding, may be assessed a fine
pursuant to this Subsection (4) and may, in addition to or in lieu of, be ordered to cease and
desist from violating Subsection 58-55-308(2), Subsection 58-55-501 (1 ), (2), (3), (9), (10),
(12), (14), (19), (21), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), or (29), or Subsection 58-55-504(2).
(ii) Except for a cease and desist order, the licensure sanctions cited in Section 58-55-401 may
not be assessed through a citation.
(b)
Page 1
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Utah Code

(i) A citation shall be in writing and describe with particularity the nature of the violation,
including a reference to the provision of the chapter, rule, or order alleged to have been
violated.
(ii) A citation shall clearly state that the recipient must notify the division in writing within 20
calendar days of service of the citation if the recipient wishes to contest the citation at a
hearing conducted under Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act.
(iii) A citation shall clearly explain the consequences of failure to timely contest the citation or to
make payment of any fines assessed by the citation within the time specified in the citation.
(c) A citation issued under this section, or a copy of a citation, may be served upon a person
upon whom a summons may be served:
(i) in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(ii) personally or upon the person's agent by a division investigator or by a person specially
designated by the director; or .
(iii) by mail.

(d)
(i) If within 20 calendar days after the day on which a citation is served, the person to whom the
citation was issued fails to request a hearing to contest the citation, the citation becomes the
final order of the division and is not subject to further agency review.
(ii) The period to contest a citation may be extended by the division for cause.
(e) The division may refuse to issue or renew, suspend, revoke, or place on probation the license
of a licensee who fails to comply with a citation after it becomes final.
(f) The failure of an applicant for licensure to comply with a citation after it becomes final is a
ground for denial of license.
(g) A citation may not be issued under this section after the expiration of six months following the
occurrence of a violation.
(h) The director or the director's designee shall assess a fine in accordance with the following:
(i) for a first offense handled pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), a fine of up to $1,000;
(ii) for a second offense handled pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), a fine of up to $2,000; and
(iii) for any subsequent offense handled pursuant to Subsection (4 )(a), a fine of up to $2,000 for
each day of continued offense.
(i)
(i) For purposes of issuing a final order under this section and assessing a fine under
Subsection (4)(h), an offense constitutes a second or subsequent offense if:
(A) the division previously issued a final order determining that a person committed a fir_st or
second offense in violation of Subsection 58-55-308(2), Subsection 58-55-501 (1 ), (2), (3),
(9), (10), (12), (14), (19), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), or (29), or Subsection 58-55-504(2); or
(B)
(I) the division initiated an action for a first or second offense;
(II) a final order has not been issued by the division in the action initiated under Subsection
(4 )(i)(i)(B )(I);
(111) the division determines during an investigation that occurred after the initiation of the
action under Subsection (4)(i)(i)(B)(I) that the person committed a second or subsequent
violation of the provisions of Subsection 58-55-308(2), Subsection 58-55-501 (1 ), (2), (3),
(9), (10), (12), (14), (19), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), or (29), or Subsection 58-55-504(2);
and
(IV) after determining that the person committed a second or subsequent offense under
Subsection (4)(i)(i)(B)(III), the division issues a final order on the action initiated under
Subsection (4)(i)(i)(B)(I).
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(ii) In issuing a final order for a second or subsequent offense under Subsection (4 )(i)(i), the
division shall comply with the requirements of this section.
0) In addition to any other licensure sanction or fine imposed under this section, the division
shall revoke the license of a licensee that violates Subsection 58-55-501 (24) or (25) two
or more times within a 12-month period, unless, with respect to a violation of Subsection
58-55-501 (24 ), the licensee can demonstrate that the licensee successfully verified the
federal legal working status of the individual who was the subject of the violation using a
status verification system, as defined in Section 13-47-102.
(k) For purposes of this Subsection (4 ), a violation of Subsection 58-55-501 (24) or (25) for each
individual is considered a separate violation.
(5)
(a) A penalty imposed by the director under Subsection (4)(h) shall be deposited into the
Commerce Service Account created by Section 13-1-2.
(b) A penalty that is not paid may be collected by the director by either referring the matter to a
collection agency or bringing an action in the district court of the county in which the person
against whom the penalty is imposed resides or in the county where the office of the director
is located.
(c) A county attorney or the attorney general of the state is to provide legal assistance and advice
to the director in any action to collect the penalty.
(d) In an action brought to enforce the provisions of this section, the court shall award reasonable
attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party.
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